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Abstract 
Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to examine the role of corporate governance in the relationship of Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) and firm size to earnings management of manufacturing firms in Indonesia. 
Methodology: The study draws on data from 66 firms listed in Indonesian Stock Exchange from 2014 to 2017, using a 
multiple regression model. The present study examines the influence of CSR on earnings management, and the impact of 
corporate governance on the relationship between CSR and firm size with earnings management. 
Main Findings: The finding showed that the effect of CSR on earnings management was significant and positive. The 
study also finds a statistically significant negative relationship between firm size and earnings management. The evidence 
also shows the role of corporate governance in the relationship of CSR and firm size to earnings management is significant 
and negative, it means that when the firm has good corporate governance, the firms that allocate CSR funds are relatively 
large, then it will tend not to practice earnings management, likewise large firms with good corporate governance will tend 
not to do earnings management. 
Research limitations/implications: The present study does not include all possible other variables that influence earnings 
management. Further research might increase the scope of research objects by extending the study period and need to pay 
attention to the firm's macro factors or economic risk factors outside of financial performance so as to provide a more 
comprehensive picture of the results of the study. 
Originality/value: The study focuses on the role of corporate governance issues such as the independence and activity of 
the boards and their influence on earnings management. The subject analyses the possible impact of CSR and firms size-
related earnings management that has received much attention from academic research, which has largely focused on 
studying the publications of corporate governance in Indonesia context and can be contributes thoughts about the 
importance of corporate social responsibility activities that are reported as a basis for consideration incorporate policy-
making to further enhance corporate awareness in the social environment, as well as the importance of corporate 
governance to minimize earnings management practices. 
Keywords: corporate social responsibility, firm size, corporate governance, earnings management, financial performance. 
INTRODUCTION 
The corporate governance perspective starts from agency theory, which identifies potential conflicts of interest between the 
owner (principal) and management (agent). An agency relationship is a contract between the owner and management. The 
occurrence of a conflict of interest between the owner and management is likely due to management acting in accordance 
with the interests of the owner, thus triggering agency costs (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Managers as company managers 
know more about internal information and company prospects than the owners. The manager as the manager is obliged to 
give a signal about the condition of the company to the owner. However, the information submitted is sometimes not in 
accordance with the actual conditions. This condition is known as information asymmetry (Cornett, McNutt, & Tehranian, 
2009). 
Corporate governance is governance that explains the relationship between various parties in the firm that determines the 
direction and corporate performance  (Monks & Minow, 2004; Yuniarti, Chandrarin & Subiyantoro, 2018). The issue of 
corporate governance is still an interesting discussion until today because issues related to governance are seen as very 
important to address corporate financial problems (Rajput & Joshi, 2014). Good corporate governance can reduce agency 
conflicts and increase disclosure that can limit information asymmetry. Weak corporate governance is considered to play 
an important role in the bankruptcy of a number of large companies and crises that occur in various countries (Reddy, 
Locke, & Scrimgeour, 2010; Ross & Crossan, 2012; Ujunwa, 2012). Research result by (Kang & Shivdasani, 1995)states 
that poor corporate governance is one of the causes of the economic crisis in East Asia in 1997-1998, including Indonesia. 
At the end of 2015, the Financial Services Authority announced that from 10 ASEAN countries in implementing good 
corporate governance, Indonesia still lags behind Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand. 
Information asymmetry between management and owners provides opportunities for managers to do earnings 
management. Earnings management is the manager's decision to choose certain accounting policies that are considered 
able to achieve the desired goals, both to increase profits and reduce the level of reported losses (Scott, 2015).Earnings 
management as a process that is intentionally carried out within the limits of generally accepted accounting principles to 
lead to the expected level of profit. Earnings management defines as a manager's decision to choose an accounting policy 
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from a certain standard with the aim of maximizing shareholder welfare and the market value of the firm (Scott, 2015). 
This is in line with the agency theory which emphasizes that the authority received by managers of firm owners to manage 
and run the firm brings logical consequences that must be carried out by managers and firm owners. 
Positive accounting theory put forward seeks to explain why accounting policies become a problem for firms and parties 
interested in financial statements and to predict accounting policies that firms want to choose under certain conditions 
(Watts; & Zimmerman, 1986). Positive accounting theory uses agency theory to explain and predict accounting policy 
choices by managers. There are three motivations that can explain why a manager makes earnings management efforts, 
namely capital market motivation, contractual motivation (bonus) or managerial compensation and debt, and government 
regulation. 
Based on positive accounting theory, one of the causes of earnings management is the political costs motive which states 
that the company concerns the government is a large firm that conducts a monopoly. The government has an interest in the 
firm in terms of taxation. Large firms in an effort to avoid taxes will tend to shrink their profits, so the firm size is used as a 
derivative of the political cost hypothesis that motivates firms to do earnings management. The firm size can be determined 
based on the number of workers, market capitalization, total sales, or total assets. One benchmark that shows the firm size 
is the total assets of the firm (Lee, 2009).Company size is a proxy of financial strength as a scale to classify the size of a 
company. One of the benchmarks to show the size of the company using the company's total assets (Dashmash, 2015; 
Isbanah, 2015; Lee, 2009; Niresh and Velnampy, 2014). Revealed that company size had a negative effect on earnings 
management (Shu and Chiang, 2014). Large companies lack the motivation to practice earnings management because 
shareholders and outside parties are considered more critical than small companies. Company size and earnings 
management have a positive effect because large-scale companies can meet the high expectations of shareholders or 
investors (Rahmani and Mir, 2013).  
Another cause of firms doing earnings management is the motive of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). This is in 
accordance with the results of research by (Chih & Shen, 2008; Kang & Shivdasani, 1995)stated that firms that are highly 
committed to CSR often delay recognition of losses or accelerate the recognition of profits. Research on the effect of CSR 
on earnings management has been carried out by previous researchers with mixed results. There is a significant positive 
relationship between CSR and earnings management (Gargouri, Shabou, & Francoeur, 2010) and a negative relationship 
between CSR and earnings management (Izadinia & Isfahani, 2014; Scholtens & Kang, 2012; Yip, Van Staden, & Cahan, 
2011), and there is no significant relationship between CSR and earnings management (Cristina et al., 2017; Dianita & 
Rahmawati, 2011). To achieve the objectives of CSR activities in improving long-term corporate performance, there 
should be integration between the role of corporate governance and the implementation of CSR. The concept of corporate 
governance is intended to achieve a more transparent corporate management. This study aims to analyze the influence of 
CSR on earnings management, and the impact of corporate governance on the relationship between CSR and firm size with 
earnings management. 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
Several studies examining the relationship between CSR on corporate financial performance directly or through earnings 
management, as well as the effect of governance on the relationship of CSR with earnings management, have been 
conducted by previous researchers.(Chun & Cho, 2015) examine the effect of CSR on earnings management that is 
moderated by corporate governance. The results show that CSR negatively influences earnings management and corporate 
governance variables strengthen the negative effect of CSR on earnings management. The dimensions of corporate social 
performance about the environment and employees are positively related to earnings management (Gargouriet al., 2010). 
This relationship can be explained by the fact that managers are involved in earnings management because of 
environmental activities that require expensive costs or as a means to cover the opportunistic behavior of management.  
Research on the relationship of CSR with earnings management has been investigated by (Scholtens and Kang, 2012). The 
results showed that CSR negatively affected earnings management. Scholtens and Kang's (2012) research results are in line 
with the results of research conducted by (Cho and Chun, 2015) and Izadinia (2014), but contradicting the results of (Chih 
et al, 2008),(Gargouri et al, 2010) and (Muttakin et al, 2015), which states that CSR has a positive effect on earnings 
management. Research conducted by (Yip et al, 2011) examined the relationship between CSR and earnings management. 
The results showed that more specifically there was a negative relationship between CSR and earnings management in the 
oil and gas industry, and there was a positive relationship between CSR and earnings management in the food 
industry. Company size is often used as a proxy for financial strength and availability of information in the market. 
Information for large companies is more available in the market than in small companies. Research conducted by 
(Siregar&Utama, 2008) found evidence that company size had no effect on earnings management. 
According to (Shleifer&Vishny, 1997), corporate governance relates to ways that company shareholders believe that they 
will get a return on their investment. Corporate governance as a system that is directed and controlled (Cadbury, 1992). 
Agency theory (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Fama 1980) emphasizes that conflicts of interest between shareholders and 
managers are at the core of agency relationships. Thus, shareholders develop a set of mechanisms to monitor and motivate 
managers to align their interests with shareholders. Corporate governance is the shareholders who build a series of 
mechanisms to monitor and motivate managers to align their interests with shareholders (Bushman and Smith, 2001). Good 
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governance is very helpful and important to limit earnings management (Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney 1996; Klein 2002; 
Sarkar, Sarkar, and Sen 2008; Prawitt, Smith & Wood 2009). 
The board of commissioners and the audit committee are important factors that inhibit the tendency of managers to manage 
earnings (Xie et al, 2002). This opinion is supported by (Hazarika et al, 2012) which states that the board of commissioners 
tends to proactively discipline managers who conduct earnings management aggressively before manipulation that causes 
cost consequences. Other research results also mentioned the independent board of commissioners (Chen et al., 2007; 
Mulyadi and Anwar, 2015) had an effect on earnings management. Research results by (Cornett et al. (2009) and 
(Mansoret al, 2013) found that corporate governance has a negative effect on earnings management. 
Good corporate governance mitigates agency problems, especially conflicts between controlling shareholders and minority 
shareholders (Liu & Lu, 2007). The results of research conducted by (Hong and Andersen, 2011) state that CSR that has 
quality will reduce earnings management activities, CSR and earnings management affects the quality of financial 
statements. Although most research supports the idea that corporate governance helps reduce corporate revenue 
management, the results of previous research are still mixed. It will be helpful to explore the interaction effects of 
corporate governance and CSR on earnings management if corporate governance has a synergy effect with other variables 
such as CSR in limiting earnings management. Researchers mostly use a narrow scope to measure corporate governance, 
such as the independence of the board of commissioners or the audit committee as a separate governance variable, rather 
than using a composite index of corporate governance that combines various dimensions of corporate governance (Jiang et 
al., 2008 ). 
This study empirically examines the effect of corporate governance on the relationship between corporate social 
responsibility, company size, and leverage with earnings management and its implications for corporate financial 
performance. The difference in this study with previous research lies in the use of corporate governance variables as 
moderating the relationship between corporate social responsibility, company size, and leverage with earnings 
management, and the use of earnings management variables as a mediating variable relationship between corporate social 
responsibility and corporate financial performance. Another difference of this study with previous research lies in the 
measurement of corporate social responsibility variables and corporate financial performance. Previous research, the 
measurement of corporate social responsibility uses a proxy for corporate social responsibility disclosure using a measure 
based on the CSR Index that refers to the disclosure of corporate social responsibility with the elements listed in the Global 
Reporting Index (GRI), while the measurement of corporate social responsibility in this study use the total CSR funds 
spent by the company. The measurement of corporate financial performance in this study uses Economic Value Added 
(EVA). EVA is the best way to explain the creation of a company's added value to revenue or net profit. EVA is the net 
operating profit after tax and capital costs. If profits are greater than the cost of capital, it creates added value for the 
company. The use of EVA makes the company focus more attention on creating corporate value (creating a firm's value). 
Previous studies, the majority of measurements of corporate financial performance using the ratio of Return on Assets 
(ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE)  as moderating the relationship between corporate social responsibility and company 
size on earnings management. 
CONCEPTUAL MODEL AND RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS  
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and Earnings Management  
The discussion of earnings management will not be separated from the grand theory of agency theory. The initiator of 
agency theory(Jensen & Meckling (1976) states that agency relations are a contract between the agent and the principal. 
The separation between ownership and management of the firm, according to agency theory can lead to agency problems. 
The relationship between the principal and the agent can lead to asymmetrical information conditions. In conditions of 
information imbalance, agents can influence the accounting numbers presented in financial statements by conducting 
earnings management. 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is a business commitment to contribute to sustainable economic development, 
through cooperation with employees and representatives of firms, local communities, and the general public to improve the 
quality of life in ways that are beneficial, both for the continuity of the firm's business and for development. In its 
development, CSR is a new breakthrough and idea put forward by (Barnea & Rubin, 2006) which is famous for the triple 
bottom line. The proposes the concept of corporate CSR in the triple bottom line focus, which unites economic, social and 
environmental rules in an integrated understanding of CSR (profit), but also has concern for the environment and people's 
welfare(Elkington, 2012) Research findings (Chih et al., 2008)stated that firms with high commitment to corporate CSR 
conduct earnings management by delaying recognition of losses or accelerating the recognition of profits. 
The results of the study by (Gargouri et al., 2010) show that the dimensions of corporate social performance about the 
environment and employees are positively related to earnings management. This relationship can be explained by the fact 
that managers are involved in earnings management because of expensive environmental activities. This study also 
underlines that corporate governance mechanisms do not hamper earnings management. Contrary to theories that aim to 
satisfy stakeholders, corporate social performance can aggravate agency problems and provide incentives for managers to 
engage in earnings management activities. Firms with high CSR activities have incentives to limit earnings management to 
Humanities & Social Sciences Reviews 
 eISSN: 2395-6518, Vol 7, No 5, 2019, pp 1338-1347 
 https://doi.org/10.18510/hssr.2019.75172 
1341 |www.hssr.in                                                                                                                                           © Ruwanti et al. 
achieve a good corporate image by getting good relationships with stakeholders. Based on the explanation above, the 
hypotheses developed in this study are: 
H1: CSR affects earnings management 
 
 
Figure 1:  Proposed Conceptual Model 
Firm Size and Earnings Management 
Firm size is a proxy of financial strength as a scale to classify the firm size. One of the benchmarks to show the firm size 
using the total assets of the firm (Dahmash, 2015; Lee, 2009; Niresh & Velnampy, 2014; Isbanah, 2013). Firms that have 
large total assets show that the firm has reached maturity. At this stage, the firm's cash flow is positive and considered to 
have good prospects in a relatively long period of time, besides that it reflects that the firm is relatively more stable and 
more able to generate profits compared to firms with small total assets. 
The firm size is also related to the quality of earnings, because the larger the size of the firm, the higher the continuity of 
the firm's business in improving financial performance, so the firm does not need to practice profit manipulation. 
Companies with high leverage are more likely to do earnings management (Dichev and Skinner, 2002; Beatty and Weber, 
2003) to maintain the company's financial performance in the eyes of stakeholders. On the other hand, (Jensen &Melking, 
1986) show that debt creation reduces the behavior of managers performing earnings management (Zamri et al., 2013). 
Managers use their discretion to control the company's cash flow. But the role of debt control starts when the manager has 
the obligation to pay the interest plus the principal. Large firms lack the motivation to practice earnings management 
because shareholders and outsiders are considered more critical than small firms. Research results by (Rahmani & Akbari, 
2013) found that firm size and earnings management have a positive effect because large-sized firms must be able to meet 
the high expectations of shareholders and investors. Therefore, the hypotheses developed in this study are: 
H2: Firm size influences earnings management 
Corporate Social Responsibility, Corporate Governance and Earnings Management 
Corporate governance is a system that regulates and controls firms that are expected to provide and increase firm value to 
shareholders (Brown & Caylor, 2006). The purpose of corporate governance is to create added value for stakeholders. The 
success of implementing corporate governance is largely determined by the quality of supervision carried out by the board 
of commissioners (Ross & Crossan, 2012). An independent board of commissioners functions to harmonize the interests of 
shareholders in order to protect the rights of minority shareholders. Financial Services Authority Regulation Number 
55/POJK.04/2015 concerning Issuers' Board of Directors and Board of Commissioners, that in order to achieve good 
corporate governance, the proportion of independent commissioners must be at least 30% of the total number of members 
of the board of commissioners. The board of commissioners is needed to maintain the integrity needed to ensure that 
supervision and advisory functions are carried out correctly. The participation of independent commissioners is designed to 
enhance the ability of the firm and harmonize the firm's resources to obtain greater profits (Ehikioya, 2009). 
The theory that supports CSR disclosure is agency theory (Jensen & Meckling (1976) which states that agency relations are 
a contract between the agent and the principal. There is a conflict of interest between the owner and management because 
the possibility of management acting is not in accordance with the interests of the owner, thus triggering the agency cost. 
Corporate governance is related to how shareholders control managers (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). In other words, 
corporate governance is expected to function to reduce or reduce agency costs. 
The results of previous studies, good corporate governance are very helpful and important in limiting earnings 
management (DeChow, Sloan, & Sweeney, 1996; Klein, 2002; Sarkar, Sarkar, & Sen, 2008; Prawitt, Smith, & Wood, 
2009). Likewise (Cho and Chun, 2015) found that CSR significantly and negatively related to earnings management and 
the relationship was moderated by corporate governance. To test this claim, we propose the following hypothesis: 
H3: Corporate governance has a significant effect on the relationship between CSR and earnings management. 
Firm Size, Corporate Governance and Earnings Management 
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The results of research conducted by (Lee & Choi, 2002)found that firm size is a variable that can influence a firm's 
tendency to manage earnings. Smaller firms do earnings management to avoid losses than larger firms. The results of (Shu 
& Chiang, 2014)study of the effect of firm size on earnings management for large firms show that earnings management 
has a positive effect on short term wealth and has a negative effect on long term wealth. To avoid the occurrence of 
information asymmetry within the firm, a good corporate governance concept is needed. With good governance, the firm 
will be more transparent, accountable, responsible, independent and reasonable. So that it will affect the practice of 
earnings management in the firm. We, therefore, propose the following hypothesis: 
H4: Corporate governance has a significant effect on the relationship between firm size and earnings management. 
METHODOLOGY 
Sample selection and data collection  
The research population is all manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) until the end of 
2017 as many as 557 companies, consisting of 9 sectors based on industry classifications determined by the IDX, namely: 
a. The main sectors consist of raw material producing industries / natural resource management industries: 
 The agricultural sector 
 The mining sector 
b.  The second sector consists of the manufacturing industry: 
 Basic and chemical industry sectors 
 Various industrial sectors 
 The consumer goods industry sector 
c.  The third sector consists of the service industry: 
 The property, real estate, and building construction sector 
  Infrastructure, utilities and transportation sectors 
 Financial sector 
 Trade-in services and investment sectors 
The research sample consisted of companies included in the manufacturing industry sector which were listed on the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange in the 2014-2017 period. The sample selection technique uses a purposive sampling method, 
namely the method of selecting samples based on certain criteria (Chandrarin, 2017) to get a representative sample in 
accordance with the specified criteria. The criteria for selecting a research sample are as follows: 
a. Manufacturing sector companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange for the period 2014 - 2017. 
b. Companies that publish complete annual reports in a row during the period 2014 - 2017. 
c. The company did not experience losses during the study period 
d. The company publishes an annual report that contains complete data related to the variables used in research. 
Based on the sample criteria above, 264 companies were obtained as research samples. The sampling technique uses 
purposive sampling method, which is a sampling method based on certain criteria to get a representative sample in 
accordance with specified criteria. The type of data in this study is quantitative data. The data structure is in the form of 
panel data which is a combination of time series and cross-sectional data.  
EMPIRICAL RESEARCH RESULTS  
This study uses moderating variable corporate governance as the main part of which the hypothesis will be tested. 
Hypothesis testing is done to determine the effect of corporate governance on the relationship between CSR and firm size 
on earnings management.  
Empirical Models to Determine the Existence of Earnings Management by Discretionary Accruals 
The formula of the Modified Jones Model (Dechow et al., 1995) as follows: 
Empirical Models to Determine the Existence of Earnings Management by Discretionary Accruals 
The formula of the Modified Jones Model (Dechow et al., 1995) as follows: 
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Where: 
TAit   =   the total accruals of the firm in period t 
CAit  =   the variation of current assets from the end of period t-1 to the end of period t 
Cashit   =   the variation of cash and cash equivalents from the end of period t-1 to the end of period t 
CLit  =   the variation of current liabilities from the end of period t-1 to the end of period t 
STDit   =   the variation of short term debt from the end of period t-1 to the end of period t 
Depit  =   the amount of depreciation and the amortization expense during period t 
 
Where: 
Revit =  firm I’s revenues in period t minus its revenues in period t-1 
Recit =  firm I’s receivables in period t minus its revenues in period t-1 
PPEit =  firm I’s plant, property, equipment in period t 
Ait-1 =  firm I’s total assets at the end of period t-1 
1, 2, 3 =  estimate coefficients of the regression 
it =  firm i’s regression error in period t 
 
Where: 
NDAit =    nondiscretionary accrual of the firm in period t 
Revit =  firm I’s revenues in period t minus its revenues in period t-1 
Recit =  firm I’s receivables in period t minus its revenues in period t-1 
PPEit =  firm I’s plant, property, equipment in period t 
Ait-1 =  firm I’s total assets at the end of period t-1 
1, 2, 3 =  estimate coefficients of the regression 
it =    firm i’s regression error in period t 
 
Where: 
DAit =   discretionary accrual of the firm in period t 
TAit-1  =   firm I’s total accruals at the end of period t-1 
Ait-1 =   firm I’s total assets at the end of period t-1 
NDAit =   nondiscretionary accrual of the firm in period t 
Empirical Model to Test the Relation Between CSR, Firm Size, Corporate Governance and Earnings Management 
Hypothesis testing tool, the special application of multiple linear regression in the regression equation contains the element 
of interaction (multiplying two or more independent variables) with the following equation: 
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Where: 
EM =    Earnings Management 
CS =    Corporate Social Responsibility 
FS =    Firm Size  
CG =    Corporate Governance 
In the above model, EM is the dependent variable and CS and FS are the independent variables. The level of discretionary 
accruals is a measure of earnings management. The moderating variable is corporate governance (CG).  
RESULTS & DISCUSSION 
Based on the results of the classic assumption test, all variables have VIF values below 10, meaning that all independent 
variables are not influenced by multicollinearity. The results of the normality test also show data spread around and near 
the diagonal line. This shows the research data is normally distributed. While the autocorrelation test shows that the value 
of Durbin Watson is greater than 1.71 (Du) and smaller than 2.26 (4-Du). It means that it can be concluded that there is no 
autocorrelation in the regression model. The results of heteroscedasticity tests, irregularly scattered dots without certain 
patterns, so that heteroscedasticity is stated not in the regression model. 
The results of data analysis with regression analysis to examine the effect of corporate governance on the relationship 
between CSR and firm size with earnings management are presented in Table 1 below. 
Table 1: The Result of Regression Analysis 
Variable 
Standardized 
Coefficients Beta 
t Sig. 
CS 0,202 3,521 0,001 
FS -0,452 -7.860 0,000 
CG -0,167 -3,044 0,003 
CS*CG -0,392 -2,038 0,001 
FS*CG -3,403 -14,019 0,000 
Notes: The following table presents the results of regression analysis. Different notations used in the table are defined as 
follows: CS=total cost of corporate social responsibility, FS= total assets, CG= ratio of the number of independent 
commissioners and total board of commissioner. This table has values in a Significant level 0,005. 
Based on Table 1, the results of the CSR variable analysis with a significance value of 0.001 smaller than the significance 
level of 0.05 and the regression coefficient of 0.202 means that there is a significant positive effect between CSR on 
earnings management, meaning that firms that allocate CSR funds are relatively large tend to do earnings management by 
increasing income. This relationship can be explained by the fact that managers who are involved in earnings management 
because of expensive CSR activities, this will have an impact on the firm's financial condition, so firms need to maintain 
the firm's image in order to continue to perform well. The results of this study are consistent with the research of (Gargouri 
et al, 2010) shows that corporate social environmental performance and employees are positively related to earnings 
management. According to the stakeholders' perspective, earnings management tends to be considered contrary to CSR 
activities that emphasize good relations with stakeholders. Firms with high CSR activities have incentives to limit earnings 
management practices to achieve a good corporate image and get good relationships with stakeholders. 
The effect of firm size variables obtained a significance value of 0,000˂ 0,005 and regression coefficient -0.452. This 
means that there is a significant and negative influence between the size of the firm and earnings management. These 
results accept the hypothesis that the firm size has a significant effect on earnings management, meaning that large firms 
tend to do earnings management by decreasing income. The size of the firm motivates the occurrence of earnings 
management practices by management because of rules such as tax rules, anti-monopoly law, banking regulations, and 
others. With the existence of anti-trust or tax avoidance laws, large-scale companies tend to reduce company profits, and 
there is also a tendency for increasing political burdens The results of this study are consistent with (Lee & Choi, 2002) 
which states that firm size with earnings management had a negative effect.  
Based on the analysis of the role of corporate governance on the relationship between CSR and earnings management, a 
significance value of 0.001 and regression coefficient was obtained 0,494, meaning that when the firm has good 
governance, firms that allocate CSR funds are relatively large, and there is a tendency to practice earnings management by 
increasing income. Good corporate governance is very helpful and important for limiting earnings management (DeChow 
et al., 1996;  Klein, 2002; Sarkar, Sarkar, & Sen, 2008; Prawitt et al., 2009). Research result by (Lin & Hwang, 2010)stated 
that corporate governance is negatively related to earnings management. Earnings management indicates explicitly the 
practice of earnings management by managers can bring negative consequences to stakeholders and this will have an 
impact on firm performance. Good corporate governance guarantees that the principles and practices of good corporate 
governance have been adhered to and applied properly. The role of corporate governance that is proxied in the role of an 
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independent board of commissioners is to monitor the policies of directors who are expected to minimize agency problems 
that arise between the board of directors and shareholders, so that the implementation of CSR as a business commitment to 
contribute to sustainable economic development will synergize with the firm's main objectives improve overall 
performance. 
The role of corporate governance on the relationship between firm size and earnings management is obtained significance 
of 0.00 smaller than the significance level of 0.05, and regression coefficient was obtained -3,90, meaning that the 
corporate governance variable has a significant and negative role in moderating the relationship between firm size and 
earnings management, meaning corporate governance the good big firms have a tendency to do earnings management by 
minimizing profits, and conversely small firms have a tendency to do earnings management by reporting greater profits so 
that they can show better firm performance. The results of this study are consistent with the research of (Lee & Choi, 2002) 
who found that firm size is a variable that affects the tendency of firms to conduct earnings management. This shows that 
the independent board of commissioners has the expertise, skills, and knowledge that is capable of carrying out the 
monitoring process. These skills effectively prevent earnings management actions, so that reported profits become more 
transparent. In order to avoid the occurrence of information asymmetry within the firm, a good corporate governance 
concept is needed, so that the firm will be more transparent, accountable, responsible, independent and reasonable. The 
greater the firm size as measured by total assets will tend to reduce management's actions to increase income. In addition, 
large firms will be more careful in conducting financial reporting and tend to report financial conditions accurately because 
they are more concerned by the public. 
CONCLUSION, LIMITATION & RECOMMENDATION 
Based on the results of the study it can be concluded that CSR has a significant positive effect on earnings management, 
and firm size has a significant negative effect on earnings management. The firms that allocate CSR funds are relatively 
large, tend to do earnings management by increasing income. The results of this study are in line with (Gargouri et al, 
2010), but in contrast to (Lee & Choi, 2002), those large firms tend to have high political costs so firms tend to practice 
earnings management by decreasing income. The results of this study are consistent with(Lee & Choi, 2002), but in 
contrast to (Rahmani & Mir, 2013)found that company size has a positive effect on earnings management, because large 
companies must be able to meet the high expectations of shareholders. The role of corporate governance in the relationship 
of CSR and firm size to earnings management is significant and negative, meaning that when the firm has good 
governance, the firms that allocate CSR funds are relatively large, there is a tendency to practice earnings management by 
minimizing profits, as well as firms. Large firms have a tendency to do earnings management by minimizing profits. The 
results of this study are consistent with (DeChow et al., 1996); (Klein, 2002) ; (Sarkar, Sarkar, & Sen, 2008) ; (Prawitt et 
al., 2009) ; (Lee & Choi, 2002). 
Research Limitation and study forward - 
Research limitations only use two variables, namely CSR and firm size as control variables, while there are still many 
other variables that influence earnings management. The number of samples is small because the study period was only in 
the period of 4 years 2014 - 2017. During this period many companies need money because it is needed in the selection of 
healthy company samples that they do not qualify as research samples. The data used is secondary data that may have 
errors in entering data in the form of numbers. The data used is secondary data which may have errors in entering data in 
the form of numbers. This research is only focused on the firm's internal performance variables in the form of financial 
ratios by not paying attention to the firm's macro factors or other economic risk factors outside the firm's performance. 
Recommendations for further research are expected to increase the scope of research objects by extending the study period 
and need to pay attention to the firm's macro factors or economic risk factors outside of financial performance so as to 
provide a more comprehensive picture of the results of the study. 
REFERENCES 
1. Barnea, A., & Rubin, A. (2006). Corporate Social Responsibility as a Conflict Between Shareholders. Journal of 
Business Ethics, 97(1), pp. 71–86. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-010-0496-z 
2. Brown, L. D., & Caylor, M. L. (2006). Corporate Governance and Firm Valuation. Journal of Accounting and 
Public Policy, 25(4), pp. 409–434, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2006.05.005 
3. Bushman, R. M., dan Smith, A.J., (2001). Financial Accounting Information and Corporate Governance. Journal 
of Accounting and Economics, 32, pp. 237–333. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0165-4101(01)00027-1 
4. Cadbury, A., (1992). Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, Volume 1, 
London: Gee & Co. Ltd. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8683.1993.tb00025.x 
5. Chandrarin, G., (2017). MetodeRisetAkuntansi: PendekatanKuantitatif. Jakarta, PenerbitSalembaEmpat. 
6. Chen, K. Y., Elder, R.J. dan Hsieh, Y.M., (2007). Corporate Governance and Earnings Management: The 
Implications of Corporate Governance Best-Practice Principles for Taiwanese Listed Companies. Journal of 
Contemporary Accounting & Economics, 3(2), pp. 73–105. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1815-5669(10)70024-2 
7. Chih, H., Shen, C., & Kang, F. (2008). Corporate Social Responsibility, Investor Protection, and Earnings 
Management : Some International Evidence. pp. 179–180. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-007-9383-7 
Humanities & Social Sciences Reviews 
 eISSN: 2395-6518, Vol 7, No 5, 2019, pp 1338-1347 
 https://doi.org/10.18510/hssr.2019.75172 
1346 |www.hssr.in                                                                                                                                           © Ruwanti et al. 
8. Chun, E., & Cho, S. (2015). Corporate Social Responsibility, Real Activities Earning Management, and Corporate 
Governance: Evidence from Korea. Asia Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics. Vol. 23. Issue 4. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/16081625.2015.1047005 
9. Cornett, M. M., McNutt, J. J., & Tehranian, H. (2009). Corporate Governance and Earnings Management at Large 
U.S. Bank Holding Companies. Journal of Corporate Finance, 15(4), pp. 412–430. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2009.04.003 
10. Cristina, M., Grecco, P., & Grecco, G. B. (2017). Corporate Social Responsibility And Its Relation With 
Performance and Earnings Management. pp. 25–44. 
11. Dahmash, F. N. (2015). Size Effect on Company Profitability : Evidence from Jordan. 10(2),  pp. 58–72. 
https://doi.org/10.5539/ijbm.v10n2p58 
12. DeChow, P. M., Sloan, R. G., & Sweeney, A. P. (1996). Causes and consequences of earnings manipulations: An 
analysis. Contemporary Accounting Research, 13(1), pp. 1–36. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1911-
3846.1996.tb00489.x 
13. Dianita, P. S., & Rahmawati. (2011). Analysis of the Effect of Corporate Social Responsibility on Financial 
Performance With Earnings Management as a Moderating Variable. 7(10), pp. 1034–1045.ISSN 1548-6583. 
14. Ehikioya, B. I. (2009). Corporate Governance Structure and Firm Performance in Developing Economies: 
Evidence from Nigeria. The International Journal of Business in Society, 9(3), pp. 231–243. 
https://doi.org/10.1108/14720700910964307 
15. Elkington, J. (2012). Towards the Sustainable Corporation: Win-Win-Win Business Strategies for Sustainable 
Development. California Management Review, 36(2), pp. 90–100. https://doi.org/10.2307/41165746 
16. Fama, E. F., (1980). Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm. Journal of Political Economy, 8(2), pp. 288–
307. https://doi.org/10.1086/260866 
17. Gargouri, R. M., Shabou, R., & Francoeur, C. (2010). The relationship Between Corporate Social Performance 
and Earnings Management. Canadian Journal of Administrative Sciences, 27(4), pp. 320–334. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/cjas.178 
18. Hazarika, S., Karpoff, J. M. danNahata, R., (2012). Internal Corporate Governance, CEO Turnover, and Earnings 
Management. Journal of Financial Economics, 104 (1), pp. 44-69. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.10.011 
19. Hong, Y. dan Andersen, M. L., (2011). The Relationship between Corporate Social Responsibility and Earnings 
Management: An Exploratory Study J Bus Ethics, 104 (4), pp. 461–471. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-011-
0921-y 
20. Isbanah, Y. (2013). Pengaruh ESOP, Leverage, and Ukuran Perusahaan Terhadap Kinerja Keuangan 
Perusahaan Di Bursa Efek.10.17970/jrem.15.150103.ID. 
21. Izadinia, N., & Isfahani, A. N. (2014). The Relationship Between Earnings Management and Social 
Responsibility, Emphasizing New Paradigms for Accounting - Profit Companies Listed in Tehran Stock Exchange 
2007-2012. 4(1), pp. 600–614.http://dx.doi.org/10.6007/IJARBSS/v4-i1/571. 
22. Jensen, M., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs And Ownership 
Structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), pp. 305–360. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(76)90026-X 
23.    Jiang, W., Lee, P. danAnandarajan, A., (2008). The Association between Corporate Governance and Earnings 
Quality: Further Evidence Using the GOV-Score. Advances in Accounting, 24 (2), pp. 191–201. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.adiac.2008.08.011 
24. Kang, J. K., & Shivdasani, A. (1995). Firm Performance, Corporate Governance, and Top Executive Turnover in 
Japan. Journal of Financial Economics, 38(1), pp. 29–58. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(94)00807-D 
25. Klein, A. (2002a). Audit Committee, a Board Of Director Characteristics, and Earnings Management. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, 33(3), pp. 375–400. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0165-4101(02)00059-9 
26. Klein, A. (2002b). Law and Economics Earnings Management. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 33(3), pp. 
375–400. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0165-4101(02)00059-9 
27. Lee, J. (2009). Does Size Matter in Firm Performance ? Evidence from US Public Firms. International Journal of 
the Economics of Business (November 2014), pp. 37–41. https://doi.org/10.1080/13571510902917400 
28. Lee. B. Brian & Choi. Byeonghee, (2013). Firm Size, Auditor Type and Earning a Management. Journal of 
Finance. 
29. Lin, J. W., & Hwang, M. I. (2010). Audit Quality, Corporate Governance, and Earnings Management: A Meta-
Analysis. SSRN, 77, pp. 57–77. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1099-1123.2009.00403.x 
30. Liu, Q. dan Lu, Z., (2007). Corporate Governance and Earnings Management in the Chinese Listed Companies: A 
Tunneling Perspective. Journal of Corporate Finance, 13, pp. 881–906. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2007.07.003 
31. Mansor, N., Che-Ahmad, A., Ahmad-Zaluki, N.A. dan Osman, A. H., (2013). Corporate Governance and 
Earnings Management: A Study on the Malaysian Family and Non-Family Owned PLCs. Procedia Economics 
and Finance, 7,  pp. 221 – 229. https://doi.org/10.1016/S2212-5671(13)00238-4  
32. Monks, R. A. G., & Minow, N. (2004). Corporate Governance. In Encyclopedia of Applied 
Ethics.https://trove.nla.gov.au/work/8351685. https://trove.nla.gov.au/version/250940365. 
33. Mulyadi, M. S. dan Anwar, Y., (2015). Corporate Governance, Earnings Management and Tax Management. 
Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences, pp. 177, 363 – 366. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.sbspro.2015.02.361 
Humanities & Social Sciences Reviews 
 eISSN: 2395-6518, Vol 7, No 5, 2019, pp 1338-1347 
 https://doi.org/10.18510/hssr.2019.75172 
1347 |www.hssr.in                                                                                                                                           © Ruwanti et al. 
34. Niresh, J. A., & Velnampy, T. (2014). Firm Size and Profitability: A Study of Listed Manufacturing Firms ed 
Manufacturing Firms in Sri Lanka. International Journal of Business and Management, 9(4), pp. 57–64. 
https://doi.org/10.5539/ijbm.v9n4p57 
35. Prawitt, D. F., Smith, J. L., & Wood, D. A. (2009). Internal Audit Quality and Earnings Management. The 
Accounting Review, 84(4), 1255–1280. https://doi.org/10.2308/accr.2009.84.4.1255 
36. Rahmani, S. dan Mir, A. A., 2013. Impact of Firm Size and Capital Structure on Earnings Management: Evidence 
from Iran. World of Sciences Journal. ISSN: 2307-3071, 62863. pp. 59-71. 
37. Rajput, N., & Joshi, B. (2014). Shareholder Types, Corporate Governance and Firm Performance: An Anecdote 
from the Indian Corporate Sector. In Asian Journal of Finance & Accounting. Vol. 7. No. 1. 
https://doi.org/10.5296/ajfa.v7i1.6070 
38. Reddy, K., Locke, S., & Scrimgeour, F. (2010). The Efficacy of Principle-Based Corporate Governance Practices 
and Firm Financial Performance: An Empirical Investigation. International Journal of Managerial Finance, 6(3), 
pp. 190–219. https://doi.org/10.1108/17439131011056224 
39. Ross, A., & Crossan, K. (2012). A Review of the Influence of Corporate Governance on the Banking Crises in the 
United Kingdom and Germany. Corporate Governance, 12(2), pp. 215–225. 
https://doi.org/10.1108/14720701211214098 
40. Sarkar, J., Sarkar, S., & Sen, K. (2008). Board of Directors and Opportunistic Earnings Management: Evidence 
from India. Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance, 23(4), pp. 517–551. 
https://doi.org/10.5296/ajfa.v7i1.6070 
41. Scholtens, B., & Kang, F. (2012). Corporate Social Responsibility and Earnings Management: Evidence from 
Asian Economies. Vol. 20. Issue 2. https://doi.org/10.1002/csr.1286 
42. Scott, W. R. (2015). Financial Accounting Theory (5th edition). Toronto, Canada: Pearson education. 
43. Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997). A Survey of Corporate Governance Andrei. The Journal of Finance,52(2), 
pp. 737–783. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107415324.004 
44. Shu, P. G., & Chiang, S. J. (2014). Firm Size, Timing, and Earnings Management of Seasoned Equity Offerings. 
International Review of Economics and Finance, 29, pp. 177–194. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.iref.2013.05.011 
45. Siregar, S. V. danUtama, S., (2008). Type of Earnings Management and the Effect of Ownership Structure, Firm 
Size, and Corporate Governance Practices: Evidence from Indonesia. The International Journal of Accounting, 
pp.  43, 1–27. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.intacc.2008.01.001 
46. Ujunwa, A. (2012). Board Characteristics and the Financial Performance of Nigerian Quoted Firms. Corporate 
Governance (Bingley), 12(5), pp. 656–674. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.jfa.20140203.17 
47. Watts;, R. L., & Zimmerman, J. L. (1986). Positive Accounting Theory. Retrieved from 
http://searchfiletype.com/fsearch/2/8/7/5/10-Positive-Accounting-Theory. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1027382 
48. Xie, B., Davidson III, W. N. danDadalt, P. J., (2002). Earnings Management and Corporate Governance: The 
Role of The Board and the Audit Committee. Journal of Corporate Finance, 9, pp. 295-316. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0929-1199(02)00006-8 
49. Yip, E., Van Staden, C., & Cahan, S. (2011). Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting and Earnings 
Management : The Role of Political Costs.5(3), pp. 17–34. 
50. Yuniarti, S., Chandrarin, G., & Subiyantoro, E. (2018). The Direct and Indirect Impacts of Good Corporate 
Governance on Banking Stability: An Empirical Study in Indonesia. International Journal of Business and 
Society, 19(S4), pp. 517–534. 
51. Zamri, N., Rahman., R. A. dan Isa, N.S.M., (2013). The Impact of Leverage on Real Earnings Management. 
Procedia Economics and Finance 7, 86 – 95. https://doi.org/10.1016/S2212-5671(13)00222-0 
 
 
 
 
 
